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ABSTRACT 
Kant and Butler have a sharp methodological conflict in justifying moral obligations. 
While Kant argues that moral obligations can only be grounded in a priori justifications rather 
than in anything empirical, Joseph Butler grounds moral obligations in the empirical knowledge 
of human beings. Despite the apparent radical difference, I argue that Kant agrees with Butler 
that moral obligations must be grounded in the understanding of human beings. They, however, 
fundamentally disagree about human nature, which generates their methodological conflict in 
studying morality. For Kant, the essential attribute for human beings is autonomy, which 
presupposes independence from any particular experience. In contrast, Butler understands human 
nature as a system that includes different particular experience. Although there is no conclusive 
answer of the correct understanding of human nature, I suggest that Butler’s account of moral 
obligations is a plausible one that can be considered as a counterexample to Kant’s account. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Butler, Kant, Morality, Human Nature   
BUTLER AND KANT ON HUMAN NATURE AND MORALITY 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
BOTIAN LIU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2019 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Botian Liu 
2019  
BUTLER AND KANT ON HUMAN NATURE AND MORALITY 
 
 
by 
 
 
BOTIAN LIU 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Eric Wilson 
 
Committee: Andrew I. Cohen 
 
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
May 2019 
DEDICATION 
I would like to dedicate my thesis to my parents and my wife, who make doing 
philosophy possible for me.   
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
I would like to acknowledge my thesis advisor, Dr. Eric Wilson, for all his inspiration 
and help on this thesis. His instruction, encouragement, and support allowed me to successfully 
complete this project. I would also like to give acknowledgment to all those who looked through 
drafts of this paper and gave me invaluable feedback on it. 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................... v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... VIII 
1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 1 
2 KANT’S REJECTION OF ALL EMPRICAL APPROACHES .......................... 2 
2.1 Ground moral obligations on absolute necessity ........................................... 2 
2.2 Ground absolute necessity on autonomy ........................................................ 7 
3 BUTLER AS A POTENTIAL COUNTEREXAMPLE TO KANT ................... 11 
3.1 Non-relational function versus relational function ...................................... 12 
3.2 Self-love’s regulative function ........................................................................ 17 
3.3 Conscience’s regulative function ................................................................... 18 
3.4 Deriving normativity from regulative function ............................................ 23 
4 COMPARISONS BETWEEN KANT AND BUTLER ........................................ 26 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 34 
 
  
viii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CrPracR  
 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
LE 
 
 
 
MM Kant 
 
Critique of Practical Reason, ed. Mary 
Gregor. (Cambridge University Press, 
2015). 
 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
ed. Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 
Lectures on ethics, ed. Peter Heath and J.B. 
Schneewind. Translated by Peter Heath. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Lara Denis. 
Translated by Mary Gregor. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017). 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION  
There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring 
into the abstract relations of things: the other, from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular 
nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to 
determine what course of life it is, which correspondent to this whole nature…The following 
discourses proceed chiefly in this later method. The three first wholly. They were intended to 
explain what is meant by nature of man, when it is said that virtue consists in following, and 
vice in deviating from it; and by explaining to that the assertion is true.  
     ---Joseph Butler1 
 
The ground of the obligation here must not be sought in the nature of the human being, or in 
the circumstances of the world in which he is places, but a priori solely in concepts of pure 
reason, and that any other prescription that is in some certain respect universal, in so far as it 
relies in the least part on empirical grounds, perhaps just for a motivating ground---can 
indeed be called a practical rule, but never a moral law.  
---Immanuel Kant2  
 
The above quotes highlight a sharp methodological difference between two philosophical 
approaches to morality. While Kant argues that moral obligations can only be grounded in a 
priori justifications rather than in anything empirical, Joseph Butler aims to ground moral 
obligations in empirical knowledge about human beings. Since they cannot both be correct, in 
this thesis, I aim to understand and evaluate their methodological conflict. Despite the apparent 
radical difference, I argue that Kant actually agree with Butler that moral obligations must be 
grounded in the understanding of human beings. Kant, however, fundamentally disagrees with 
Butler about human nature, which generates their methodological conflict in studying morality. 
For Kant, the most essential attribute for human beings is freedom, which is the capacity to set 
                                                 
1. Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics, ed. by David McNaughton (Oxford 
University Press, 2017), P, 12 & 13. All quotations from Butler are from David McNaughton’s 
edition of Fifteen Sermons and Other Writings on Ethics (Oxford, 2017). References to Butler’s 
sermons and their preface are given in the following manner respectively: S2, 10; P, 12. The part 
before the comma refers to the number of the sermon or the preface; the part after the comma 
refers to the numbering of the paragraph. 
 
2. Immanuel Kant, The Groundwork of Metaphysis, 4:389. All citations of Kant’s works will be 
based on the Academy edition.   
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one’s own ends without the influence of any particular experience, i.e inclinations, desires, 
feelings. In contrast, Butler understands human nature as a system that includes different 
particular experiences. Although there is no conclusive answer about the correct understanding 
of human nature, I suggest that Butler’s account of moral obligation is a plausible one that can be 
considered as a counterexample to Kant’s strong position that only a priori justification can 
ground moral obligations. 
 
2 KANT’S REJECTION OF ALL EMPRICAL APPROACHES 
2.1 Ground moral obligations on absolute necessity 
Kant rejects all empirical propositions as the justificatory ground for moral obligations 
because he believes that moral obligations must have “absolute necessity” (G, 4:389) and “it is 
an outright contradiction to want to extract necessity from an empirical proposition” (CPracR, 
5:12).3 Two questions arise with Kant’s rejection. First, what does Kant mean by “necessity?” 
Second, how plausible is Kant’s claim that moral obligations must have the kind of necessity he 
has in mind? Since the answer to the second question depends on the answer to the first question, 
I will start with articulating Kant’s conception of necessity in his moral theory. I argue that Kant 
holds a very strong conception of necessity that does rule out all empirical justifications.  
In the preface of the Groundwork, Kant says: 
Everyone must admit that a law, if it is to hold morally, must carry with it absolute 
necessity [emphasis added]; that the command: thou shalt not lie, does not just hold for 
                                                 
3. Kant does not have to commit to the thesis that identification of the supreme principle of morality 
must be purely a priori. In the Groundwork I, Kant seems to identify the supreme principle from 
our common sense of a good will. What Kant clearly holds is the thesis that the justification of 
the supreme principle of morality must be purely a priori. This paper concerns solely on the 
second thesis. For further discussion on this point, see Paul Guyer, The Virtues of Freedom: 
Selected Essays on Kant (Oxford University Press, 2016). Philip Kitcher. “‘A Priori’.” In The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge 
University Press (2006). 
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human beings only, as if other rational beings [emphasis added] did not have to heed 
it; and so with all remaining actual moral laws; hence that  the ground of the obligation 
here must not be sought in the nature of the human being, or in the circumstances of 
the world in which he is places, but a priori solely in concepts of pure reason, and that 
any other prescription that is in some certain respect universal, in so far as it relies in 
the least part on empirical grounds, perhaps just for a motivating ground---can indeed 
be called a practical rule, but never a moral law.4 (G, 4:389) 
 
The first sentence in the passage seems to imply that Kant holds the absolute necessity of moral 
obligation as an assumption with which everyone agrees. I will come back to discuss whether 
this assumption is as obvious as Kant thinks, but the central issue for now is to figure out what 
Kant means by necessity. I will simplify the task by not focusing on providing a positive account 
of Kant’s conception of necessity. Instead, I tackle this issue from the opposite end by asking: 
What counts as contingent for Kant in his moral theory? There are two advantages for this 
approach. On the one hand, we do not need to engage the daunting task of articulating Kant’s 
full-blown view of necessity. On the other hand, we can better pinpoint Kant’s argument by 
transferring the negative claims such as “hypothetical imperatives do not have absolute 
necessity” into a positive one “hypothetical imperatives are always contingent.” Then we can 
ask: In what sense are they contingent? Why does this contingency rule out moral obligations?  
Contingency of a moral rule comes in different senses. A moral rule is contingent if it 
constrains me in some situations but not in other situations; if it constrains me in all situations 
but not others; if it constrains actual rational beings, i.e. human beings, but not counterfactual 
rational beings in some possible worlds. As the previous passage shows, Kant believes that 
morality is contingent if it just holds for human beings but not for other rational beings. This 
means, as I shall argue, any particular experience, i.e. feelings, desires, inclinations, is 
                                                 
4. For similar discussions of rational beings as such in the Groundwork, see 4:408, 4:411-3, and 
4:425-6. 
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contingent to rational beings, who are the appropriate subjects of morality. I must clarify a 
potential misunderstanding right away. I do not claim that having experience is contingent to 
rational beings. This is clearly false according to Kant, who always acknowledges the finite 
nature of rational beings. To illustrate this point, let me start with the concept of pure rational 
beings. Kant hardly ever uses this term, but I introduce it to avoid some unnecessary semantic 
issues. A pure rational being is someone who only has the faculty of pure reason. In contrast, a 
rational being is someone who has not only the faculty of pure reason, but also other sensible 
faculties. Even a holy being does not have to be a pure rational being. A holy being might be 
someone whose inclinations and pure reason always line up in determining a will. For a holy 
being, there are no imperatives and obligations because imperatives and obligations presuppose 
the conflict between subjective inclinations and objective laws recognized by pure reason (G, 
4:414). A human being, who belongs to the subset of rational beings, is someone whose 
subjective inclinations often conflict with the objective laws. Since the conflict is required, 
Kant’s moral theory presupposes the necessity for rational beings to have inclinations, desires, 
interests and other sensible experience.       
However, the necessity of having experience does not imply that having any particular 
inclinations, desires or interests is necessary for a rational being. For example, as human beings, 
we find pleasure desirable and suffering undesirable. But a rational being, with a different 
cognitive and conative structure, might find pleasure undesirable and suffering desirable. In 
other words, some rational beings might have totally different inclinations as human beings 
normally have. Therefore, any moral rules derived from particular inclinations will be contingent 
because all particular inclinations are contingent. The earlier quote from Kant hints his belief 
that particular inclinations are contingent. Kant claims that a rule holds universally for human 
5 
beings is not automatically qualified as a moral law because it might not hold universally for all 
rational beings. This claim presupposes the contingent nature of human beings. Otherwise, 
commands that hold universally for human beings would necessarily hold for rational beings. 
Kant’s other works further demonstrate his belief that any particular inclinations are 
contingent. In his lectures, Kant says: 
But morality simply does not admit of being felt. All rules derived from feeling are 
contingent, and valid only for beings that have such a feeling. Feeling is a satisfaction 
that rests on the constitution of a sense. So it would then be all one, if God had also 
framed in us a liking for vice, and then He might equally have done it in other creatures 
as well. Such laws are therefore merely arbitrary, and simply a childish game. (LE, 
29:625) 
 
In this passage, Kant implies that all particular feelings are contingent for rational beings 
because feelings rest on having a specific way of sensing the world. For Kant, since the senses 
we use to generate feelings can be constituted in radically different ways for other rational 
beings, and a universal law must also hold for other rational beings, no moral laws can be 
derived from particular feelings. In other words, if we assume a feeling can be necessary for 
rational beings, then the rules derived from this feeling should also be necessary. But Kant 
clearly rejects this. A similar idea can be found in the Critique of Practical Reason. Arguing that 
a law must be free from any material or empirical condition, Kant states that particular 
experience such as a sympathetic sensibility cannot be presupposed in all rational beings because 
God does not necessarily have it (CPracR, 5:34). Kant suggests a very strong test condition for 
things that are necessary for rational beings. If we cannot presuppose a particular feeling in God, 
then the feeling is contingent thus is not appropriate for establishing a law. Kant’s exact 
conception of God is not important here, but it is fair to say that God is very close to a pure 
rational being. Given this conception of contingency, Kant can rule out all empirical approaches 
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in grounding moral obligations because empirical approaches rely on identifying particular 
experience that is contingent for rational beings as such.  
Let me address a potential objection to my interpretation, which seems to be implied by 
Kant’s discussion of happiness. In the Groundwork, Kant seems to treat happiness as necessary 
for rational beings: 
[T]here is one end that can be presupposed as actual in all rational beings, and thus one 
purpose that they not merely can have, but that one can safely presuppose they one and all 
actually do have according to a natural necessity, and that is the purpose of 
happiness……One must present it [happiness] as necessary not merely to some uncertain, 
merely possible purpose, but to be a purpose that one can presuppose safely and a priori 
in every human being, because it belongs to his essence…. Thus, the imperative that refers 
to the choice of means to one’s own happiness, i.e. the prescription of prudence, is still 
hypothetical; the actions is not command per se but just as means to another purpose [my 
emphases]. (G, 4:416) 
 
In this passage, Kant claims that happiness is not contingent for human beings, which opens the 
possibility that the inclination for happiness is not contingent. If the inclination for happiness is 
necessary, then the principle of happiness, which is a hypothetical imperative---you should do X 
because it promotes your happiness---seems to have the equal binding force as the categorical 
imperative---you should do X because it is your duty. The prima facie challenge for Kant is to 
demonstrate exactly why this hypothetical imperative of prudence cannot bind us to the same 
degree as categorical imperatives bind us.  
One might suggest the following reply on behalf of Kant: the imperative from the 
principle of happiness is hypothetical, and there is a fundamental distinction between 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Since the former is conditional and the latter is not, the 
former can only counsel while the latter can command. This intuition, however, is not self-
evident for me. In fact, as hinted earlier, I have the opposite intuition. If the inclination for 
happiness is absolutely necessary, then the hypothetical imperative of prudence should bind as 
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equally as the categorical imperative does. I do not think Kant relies simply on this intuition. 
Instead, he distinguishes the two kinds of imperatives according to the degree of contingency and 
rules out the principle of happiness based on the strong conception of contingency I previously 
discussed. Right after the above passage, Kant states: 
[O]nly the law carries with it the concept of an unconditional and indeed objective and 
hence universally valid necessity, and commands are laws that must be obeyed, i.e. must 
be complied with even contrary to inclination. Giving counsel does indeed contain 
necessity, but it can hold only under a subjective contingent condition, if this or that human 
being counts this or that as belonging to his happiness; whereas the categorical imperative 
is limited by no condition, and as absolutely and yet practically necessary can quite 
properly be called a command [my emphases]. (ibid.)   
 
As Kant acknowledges, the hypothetical imperative of happiness, which can counsel but not 
command, does entail a sense of necessity. What it lacks is the absolute necessity that morality 
requires. This imperative lacks the absolute necessity because it relies on particular desire, which 
is contingent. Although happiness as an abstract concept is necessary for all rational beings, it 
nonetheless depends on contingent sensible faculty because each of us identifies happiness with 
the “particular feeling of pleasure and displeasure” (CPracR, 5:25). Therefore, the principle of 
happiness cannot be a command because it relies on particular feeling, which is always 
contingent for rational beings based on Kant’s strong conception of contingency. Thus, the 
necessity of happiness does not contradict Kant’s claim that any particular experience is 
contingent for rational beings as such.   
2.2 Ground absolute necessity on autonomy 
If we agree with Kant’s conception of contingency and his claim that morality must have 
absolute necessity, then we should agree with him that no empirical approach is capable of 
grounding moral obligation. To evaluate the plausibility of Kant’s claim, we need to first find 
out his arguments for the claim. Kant, however, does not provide explicit arguments. He seems 
8 
to hold this claim as an uncontroversial assumption. But given Kant’s strong conception of 
contingency, we cannot accept it too quickly. This situation forces us to reconstruct an argument 
for Kant’s assertion. In what follows, I will draw on Paul Guyer’s interpretation of Kant to 
suggest a potential argument for Kant’s rejection of all empirical approaches based on the 
necessity of morality. I choose Guyer’s interpretation for two reasons. First, I think his 
interpretation is very convincing and probably correct. Second, Guyer’s interpretation will 
provide us a common ground to compare the methodological difference between Kant and 
Butler. Two claims in Guyer’s interpretations are especially relevant to our current discussion. 
First, Kant derives “ought” from “is.” Put differently: Kant establishes moral obligations from 
descriptive facts of rational beings. Second, Kant relies on the fact that freedom, or autonomy, is 
the most essential attribute for rational beings. If we do not have autonomy, we are no more 
different than animals. 
It is commonly thought that Kant follows David Hume’s sharp distinction between 
“ought” and “is,” accepting that no normative principles can be derived from descriptive 
statements because they have entirely different foundations. Guyer, however, argues that Hume 
and Kant do not hold this view. What they hold is that “ought” must be derived from the right 
kind of “is.” Normative principles cannot be derived from the objective facts about the external 
world, like what rationalists try to do. Instead, the normative principles can be derived from facts 
about human beings (2016, pp. 21-35). We normally approach descriptive facts of human nature 
from an empirical perspective, trying to understand the psychological and biological aspects of 
human beings. Kant, on the other hand, stresses the inadequacy of such empirical approaches. 
For him, some aspects of human beings can only be understood a priori. Kant distinguishes two 
kinds of descriptive facts about human nature. I will use rational nature to refer to the 
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description that cannot be understood with empirical approaches. It is a description of our 
noumenal self. I will use non-rational nature to refer to what Kant usually calls human nature, or 
the descriptions about the phenomenal self. Kant rejects all moral theories that are based on our 
non-rational nature because these theories ignore the most essential feature of human nature---
autonomy---that can only be found in the noumenal self.  
For Kant, the rational nature that distinguishes rational beings from animals is the 
capacity to set one’s end. In the Groundwork, he explicitly says “a rational nature is 
distinguished from the others by this, that it sets itself an end” (G, 4:437). In the Metaphysics of 
Morals, he illustrates the same point with a slightly different term---humanity. As Kant points 
out, “the capacity to set oneself an end---any end whatsoever---is what characterizes humanity 
(as distinguished from animality)” (MM, 6:392).5 This capacity to set one’s end presupposes 
freedom, both in its negative and positive senses. The negative freedom allows rational beings to 
will without the influence of passions, inclinations and feelings. These sensible dispositions are 
“the monsters one has to fight” (MM, 6:405). The positive freedom, which is the autonomy, 
allows the will to be a law to itself (G, 4:440). In other words, if a will is autonomous, its sole 
determination is the will itself. The autonomous will is in a sense the unmoved mover. The 
autonomous nature of rational beings is controversial due to the seemingly logic contradiction of 
unmoved mover, I will come back to this point later. The upshot of previous discussion is that 
for Kant, we are not rational beings without freedom.  
Even if rational beings are autonomous, why must morality be absolute necessary? I will 
answer this question by asserting a famous and widely accepted thesis coined by Henry Allison--
-the Reciprocity Thesis. According to this thesis, a free will and a will under moral laws are 
                                                 
5. Earlier in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes “…More and more toward humanity, by which 
he alone is capable of setting himself ends” (MM, 6:387). 
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identical. As Kant states in the third section of the Groundwork, “if freedom of the will is 
presupposed, morality along with its principle follows from it, by mere analysis of its concept” 
(G, 4:447). Being rational beings requires freedom, which presupposes the exclusion of any 
particular experience. Since being rational is equivalent to being under moral laws, morality also 
requires freedom. Therefore, morality itself must be necessary in the sense that any particular 
experience is contingent. In other words, since any contingent element will deprive us from 
being free, which is identical to being under moral laws, all empirical approaches are not 
appropriate for grounding moral laws. One difficulty for Kant’s descriptive account of rational 
nature is his metaphysical conception of autonomy. The transcendental nature of autonomy has 
generated controversy for centuries. Since Kant’s rejection of all empirical approaches depends 
on his account of rational nature, an evaluation of his methodological commitment relies on the 
evaluation of his descriptive account of human nature. I shall postpone the evaluation until I lay 
out a competing account of human nature from Joseph Butler. Having both accounts helps us see 
the difficulty of evaluating which account is better. 
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3 BUTLER AS A POTENTIAL COUNTEREXAMPLE TO KANT 
If my analysis so far is correct, then we see that Kant’s insistence on a pure a priori 
approach to morality’s normative foundation is rooted in his belief that human beings are 
autonomous. Joseph Butler shares the same fundamental assumption with Kant---moral 
obligations must be grounded in the descriptive facts about human nature. They disagree about 
the basic account of human nature. While Kant takes the essential part of human nature to be 
autonomy, which enables the will to be determined by itself without any influence from sensible 
experience such as inclinations, emotions and feelings, Butler treats human nature as a system. 
Distinguishing passions, self-love, benevolence and conscience as different parts of our nature 
and articulating their relations, Butler famously argues that conscience has supreme authority 
over other parts, so we ought to act in accordance with conscience. For Butler, to understand the 
system is to understand the relations between different parts, which necessarily include the non-
rational nature. Therefore, an empirical approach is necessary to justify moral obligations 
according to the method chosen by Butler.  
Although most commentators agree that the doctrine of the supremacy of conscience is 
the most distinctive element of Butler’s moral philosophy, they disagree about what arguments 
Butler provides to defend this doctrine and whether his arguments are convincing. A central 
issue for using Butler’s account as a counterexample to Kant’s account is whether Butler 
successfully grounds moral obligations in non-rational human nature. In order to be counted as a 
counterexample, Butler’s account needs to accomplish two things. First, it needs to establish 
normativity. Second, it must derive moral obligations from the non-rational nature of human 
beings. If Butler grounds moral obligations with a disguised rationalist account based on abstract 
facts about the world, then his account is not a counterexample. However, this does mean 
12 
Butler’s account must be free of a priori propositions. Since Kant holds a strong view that 
nothing empirical can be used to justify moral obligation, as long as something empirical is 
necessary for Butler’s account, this account will be a potential counterexample to Kant.     
 Butler does achieve the two things mentioned above. I shall argue that Butler’s 
arguments for the supremacy of conscience derive directly from conscience’s non-normative 
functional role to regulate other parts of our nature. Although it is debatable whether normativity 
can be derived from descriptive facts at all, Butler does not rely on any assumption that is less 
plausible than that of Kant. I will postpone the discussion of normativity to the next section, the 
main task for this section is to restore Butler’s account of human nature and his attempt to derive 
moral obligations from it. The unique feature of Butler’s moral theory is that it does not rely on 
any intrinsic value of a particular faculty. Although he argues that conscience is the supreme 
feature of human nature, he arrives at this conclusion by understanding the relationship between 
conscience and other parts of our nature. I believe previous interpretations have overlooked this 
perspective of Butler’s account. My interpretation of Butler concentrates on his emphasis of 
human nature as a system and the relationship between different parts.  
3.1 Non-relational function versus relational function  
I shall argue that the supremacy of conscience is grounded in its regulative function, which 
is relational. Let me start with some examples. The most familiar example for contemporary 
readers is a computer. Every computer has a central processing unit (CPU), which constantly 
collects information sent from other parts such as the keyboard, the mouse, and the graphics 
cards. The CPU also sends instructions back to those parts after performing basic arithmetic, 
logical and input/output operations. In this sense, the CPU regulates other parts of the computer. 
Obviously, Butler never saw a computer, so let us look at some examples around the 18th 
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century. A mechanical watch is the example Butler uses. He claims that we can never understand 
the idea of a watch by focusing solely on its parts. We can only understand the idea when we 
“consider the respects and relations” the different parts “have to each other” (P, 14). Although it 
is unclear whether Butler considers any part of a watch to be regulative, regulation is important 
for a watch to function properly. The escapement wheel is the part that regulates the energy input 
from the mainspring. It makes sure the energy from the mainspring is released at a steady pace. 
Another 18th-century example is a centrifugal governor.6 The crucial function of a governor is to 
regulate the speed of a mill or other energy source, and transferring the energy into controlled 
motions. In a drawing of centrifugal governor, James Watt titled it as “Centrifugal speed 
regulator.”7 This example shows the close connection between the regulative function of a part 
and its special importance as a governor of the entire system. In a broad sense, for Butler, 
conscience is similar to the CPU, the escapement wheel and the centrifugal governor. It regulates 
other parts of our nature, including self-love and benevolence.               
These examples also highlight a distinction between my approach and previous 
commentators’ approach. I emphasize conscience’s relational function rather than its non-
relational function. In the previous example, the CPU’s regulative function is relational because 
it cannot collect data from other parts and send instructions back to those parts without 
interacting with them. In contrast, the CPU’s calculating operation is non-relational because this 
function does not require interaction with other parts. Once the data are collected, the CPU 
performs calculation by itself. According to the non-relational approach, in a system, part A is 
superior to part B because A has non-relational function X and B either lacks X or has non-
                                                 
6. Thank Dr. Eric Wilson for the example.  
 
7. See S. Bennett (1993), The History of Control Engineering 1800-1930, pp.13. 
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relational function Y that is inferior to X. In order words, we establish the superiority between A 
and B based on the superiority between their non-relational functions X and Y. The non-
relational approach is the default interpretation of Butler’s argument for the supremacy of 
conscience. Commentators offer different views of which non-relational function accentuates 
conscience’s superiority. One common interpretation focuses on conscience’s ability to 
“pronounce determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be in 
themselves evil, wrong, unjust” (S2, 8). Other parts such as self-love clearly lack this function of 
making moral judgements.8   
Self-love, however, has its own unique function—to secure one’s own happiness with the 
best means. The unsettled problem for the non-relational approach is to show that the function of 
conscience is superior to the function of self-love. There seems to be no other way but relying on 
the overridingness of moral judgment. Terence Penelhum follows this line of thought. He argues 
that the function of making moral judgments is superior because “each of us is the sort of 
creature who is endowed with a recognition of the fact that the judgment of rightness or 
wrongness embodies an overriding reason, and that we should disregard the resistance to 
obligation of which the question is a sophisticated expression” (1985, p. 71). The overridingness 
of moral judgment, Penelhum continues, is a kind of knowledge or intuition that Butler believes 
                                                 
8. A non-relational approach might focus on the reflective power of conscience. P.F. Brownsey 
(1995, pp. 71-2) correctly notes the problem for this approach. Although it could be argued that 
self-love is superior than passions because self-love is reflective while passions are not, it is 
unclear how to establish conscience’s superiority over self-love since both of them are reflective 
faculties. Terence Irwin (2008, p. 513) argues that conscience expresses the reflective function 
more fully than self-love. However, Irwin’s account ultimately relies on conscience’s ability to 
reflect upon “my nature as a whole,” which self-love lacks (ibid., p. 524). Reflecting upon nature 
as a whole presupposes the relational regulative function between conscience and other parts of 
our nature.       
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everyone has. So “the onus [of proof] is on those who think some other clear sense exists, to 
elucidate it, and that their success is not conspicuous” (p. 73). 
Penelhum’s interpretation has at least two problems. First, it reduces the normative force 
of Butler’s account to a Clarkean rationalist approach, which obscures the distinctness of 
Butler’s approach. Based on this interpretation, the sole function of conscience is to grasp the 
abstract moral facts in the world, which grounds the overridingness of moral judgment. Although 
Butler claims that his account and Clark’s account “both lead us to the same thing” (P, 12), he 
does not claim that his account depends on Clark’s account. Butler only says that their 
approaches are compatible. Immediately after introducing conscience’s function of making 
moral judgments, Butler states “But this part of the office of conscience is beyond my present 
design explicitly to consider” (S2, 8). The “present design” for Butler is to establish the 
normative authority of conscience. And he wants to alert us here that he is not trying to achieve 
this goal by relying on conscience’s ability to make moral judgments. Elsewhere, Butler states: 
Yet let any plain honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, ‘Is 
this I am going about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or is it evil?’ I do not in the least 
doubt but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue [emphasis 
added], by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance.” (S3, 4) 
 
Butler notes that virtue and moral judgments coincide, which implies that virtue is not derived 
from the judgments of right and wrong, for if right moral judgments define virtue, it will be 
redundant to point out that moral judgments and virtue always agree. Second, Penelhum’s 
interpretation imposes a dilemma on Butler. According to his interpretation, the normative force 
of conscience depends on its ability to make correct moral judgments. The moral judgments of 
conscience are either fallible or infallible. If they are infallible, how can Butler defend this 
awfully strong claim? If they are fallible and we can know when they are false, as Penelhum 
holds, then there must be another faculty distinct from conscience that can discern the mistakes 
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made by conscience. If this “other” faculty exists, it is unclear why Butler holds conscience as 
the supreme faculty instead of the “other” faculty.     
These problems of the non-relational approach plus Butler’s commitment to understand 
human nature as a system motivate my relational approach. The relational approach establishes 
superiority based on the relation part A and part B bear. A is superior to B just because A bears a 
regulative relation, which is asymmetric, with B. For example, the CPU is superior to other parts 
of a computer such as a mouse or graphics cards not because of its unique function of performing 
basic arithmetic operations. The CPU is superior to other parts because it constantly monitors 
and collects data from other parts and it sends instructions back to these parts, and not vice 
versa. The CPU cannot accomplish the regulative function without interacting with other parts.9 
As far as I know, no one has fully developed this interpretation of Butler. The closest account is 
suggested by Ralph Wedgwood. He draws our attention to a crucial passage where Butler states 
“you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, 
superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself” (S2, 14). I will 
quote Wedgewood’s insightful interpretation of this passage in length:  
 This argument seems to start from identifying certain features of conscience. One feature 
is conscience’s “superintendency,” which seems to consist in the way in which conscience 
considers and oversees all the other internal principles of the mind. Another feature is its 
capacity for “judgment”, which may consist in the fact that it arrives at all-things-
considered judgments about what is right or wrong, good or bad, aiming to take all relevant 
considerations into account. The final feature is its capacity for “direction”, which may 
consist in the fact that we have a fundamental disposition to be moved to action by the 
directions of our conscience. (2007, p. 194) 
 
                                                 
9. The “superiority” of the CPU is not normative because it simply describes the non-normative 
asymmetric relational function of the CPU on other parts. One might try to establish the 
normative “superiority” from the non-normative functional relation, but we should not 
automatically equate the two senses of superiority. I focus solely on the non-normative relation in 
this section.    
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I agree with Wedgewood’s interpretation of “superintendency” and “direction.” Overseeing other 
internal principles underscores the relational function of conscience over other faculties. 
However, I think Wedgewood misinterprets what Butler means by “judgement” here. Butler is 
not talking about the non-relational function of making moral judgments, but the relational 
function of evaluating other principles. Judgment, direction and superintendency constitute 
conscience’s regulative function. Because Wedgewood interprets “judgment” in an indirect way, 
he concludes that “it is not completely clear why Butler says that a faculty that has these features 
‘claims superiority from its very nature’ (ibid.)” In what follows, I shall elucidate this regulative 
function in a finer grain, which helps us better understand Butler’s account of human nature and 
his argument for the normative supremacy of conscience.  
3.2 Self-love’s regulative function 
Butler starts the discussion of regulative function with self-love. The function of self-love 
is to regulate passions in order to secure happiness for ourselves. Butler realizes that it is not easy 
to distinguish different parts of our nature, so he believes “it will be necessary to consider the 
nature, the object and end of” different faculties (S11, 4). For Butler, the objects of passions are 
external things like food or esteem, whereas the object of self-love is one’s own happiness. 
However, self-love is not a blind desire for happiness because it also “puts us upon obtaining and 
securing” happiness, which requires a reflective power to regulate passions (S11, 9). 
To see why it is necessary for self-love to have regulative power, we need to know more 
about Butler’s concept of happiness. For Butler, happiness “does not consist in self-love,” it 
consists in “the gratification of particular passions” (S11, 9). In other words, if I am hungry and I 
get a good meal, I will be happy. Similarly, if I desire esteem and get into a prestigious PhD 
program, I will be happy. However, being happy is more complex than fulfilling an immediate 
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passion. First, although the gratification of particular passions always brings me immediate 
happiness, it might not bring me long-term happiness. Butler repeatedly emphasizes that a 
passion might motivate us to “rush upon certain ruin for the gratification of a present [emphasis 
added] desire” (S1, footnotes 3; S2, 10). Thus, in order to secure long-term happiness, self-love 
must make judgments when a person is about to act according to a passion. In the situation given 
by Butler, self-love will always judge against running into self-harm. In addition, we often have 
multiple passions that are potentially conflicting. In these situations, self-love’s regulative 
function is necessary in order to help one achieve long-term happiness. As David McNaughton 
helpfully articulates: 
[T]he gratification of any affections gives us pleasure, but gratification of one often 
impedes the gratification of others. Our overall long-term happiness consists in 
harmonizing their gratification, so that each affection attains its object within its due stint 
and bound. This harmonizing is the task of self-love.” (2017, p. xvi)   
 
Thus, self-love is the faculty that superintends and judges upon different passions. Can self-love 
provide a judgment without overseeing and evaluating passions? No. Butler tells us that “take 
away these affections, and you leave self-love absolutely nothing at all to employ itself about” 
(P, 37).   
3.3 Conscience’s regulative function  
Conscience’s regulative function is essentially the same as self-love’s regulative function, 
but Butler does not tell us explicitly what parts of our nature conscience regulates. I shall argue 
that the objects of conscience, for Butler, are self-love and benevolence. Butler first introduces 
conscience as: 
There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, approve and 
disapprove their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures as to reflect 
upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its 
propositions, aversions, passions, affections, as respecting such objects, and in such 
degrees…This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, 
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and actions, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though sometimes it is 
used so as to take in more. (S1, 8) 
 
This passage can be read in two ways. One can stress conscience’s function of approving and 
disapproving actions based on right and wrong. This will lead to the non-relational approach. I 
have argued that Butler does not take this approach. Instead I think Butler emphasizes the 
relational function of conscience, which “reflects upon our own nature.” Butler almost always 
describes conscience as a faculty that judges other parts of our nature. Conscience distinguishes 
between the “internal principles of his heart” (S2, 8). Conscience “approves or disapproves the 
several affections of our mind” (S8, 9).  
Although Butler does not explicitly say that conscience regulates self-love, he is likely to 
hold this view. To illustrate, we need to note two things about self-love. First, self-love is just 
one part of our whole nature and it has flaws. Second, self-love can be in conflict with 
benevolence. Butler states, “How much soever therefore is to be allowed for self-love, yet it 
cannot be allowed to be the whole of our inward constitution; because, you see, there are other 
parts or principles which come into it” (S11, 8). The distinction between nature and whole nature 
is important. For Butler, the most basic sense of “nature” is just “some principle in man, without 
regard either to the kind or degree of it” (S2, 5).10 Thus, acting in accordance with passions, self-
love, benevolence and conscience are equally natural in this basic sense. However, when he 
claims that virtue is following our nature, he is not using “nature” in the basic sense. He is 
talking about our whole nature, which includes conscience’s regulation upon self-love. 
Moreover, Butler warns us about the self-defeating feature of self-love, which is made known by 
Henry Sidgwick as the “fundamental paradox of egoistic hedonism.” The more we focus on our 
                                                 
10. “Principles” for Butler should be understood as passions, inclinations or feelings, which are very 
different from Kant’s use of the term. Principles for Kant are rules or laws used for deriving 
maxims.   
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own happiness, the less happy we will be. So “disengagement is absolutely necessary to 
enjoyment” (S11, 9). How can we disengage from the obsession of self-love? Since self-love 
cannot oversee itself, conscience needs to oversee self-love, making sure we are not obsessed 
with it.  
Self-love has a counterpart. “Benevolence,” Butler states, “is in some degree to society, 
what self-love is to the individual” (S1, 6). While self-love is a reflective faculty that puts us 
upon securing happiness for ourselves, benevolence is a reflective faculty that puts us upon 
securing other’s happiness. It is not hard to imagine situations where self-love and benevolence 
conflict. For example, while on her way to an important meeting, Bobo sees someone in need of 
help. If Bobo helps him, she would not be able to make the meeting, which would have 
considerable negative effects on her career. In situations like this, since self-love reflects solely 
on Bobo’s happiness and benevolence reflects solely on the happiness of the person who needs 
help, Bobo cannot make a harmonious decision without relying on conscience’s judgment upon 
self-love and benevolence.        
Butler, however, seems to believe that self-love and benevolence rarely contradict each 
other. If this is true, it will undermine my interpretation because there is no need for conscience 
to regulate. To answer this objection, we need to pay attention to Butler’s distinction between 
benevolence as a passion and benevolence as a reflective principle:11 
 Love of our neighbor is one of those affections. This, considered as a virtuous principle, is 
gratified by a consciousness of endeavoring to promote the good of others; but considered 
as a natural affection, its gratification consists in the actual accomplishment of this 
endeavor. (S11, 16)    
 
                                                 
11. For a similar discussion, see C.D.Broad (1959), Butler, pp. 71-73 and Terrence Irwin (2008), 
Butler, pp. 507-510. 
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Benevolence as a passion is just a desire to promote other’s happiness, which is no more 
different than passions for food or esteem. Similar to other passions, benevolence is also an 
“instrument of private enjoyment” because the gratification of it will bring one happiness. Thus, 
Butler holds that “there is no peculiar rivalship or competition between self-love and 
benevolence” (S11, 19).  
An obvious weakness of Butler’s argument is that it exaggerates our passion of 
benevolence. Most people are not as benevolent as Butler thinks, so it is unclear how much 
happiness they can gain by promoting others’ happiness. However, for the sake of argument, let 
us accept Butler’s assertion. Nonetheless, I agree with Terrence Irwin (2008, p. 524) that 
benevolence as a reflective principle might conflict with self-love. The example of Bobo offers a 
situation of such conflict. Furthermore, Butler’s discussion on how much we should love our 
neighbors underscores the potential tension between benevolence and self-love. For Butler, one 
must love her neighbors and herself in the same degree (S12, 6). Given this strong requirement 
of benevolence, it is not hard to think about situation where one cannot promote other’s 
happiness and one’s own happiness simultaneously.12 Therefore, conscience, for Butler, is the 
faculty that regulates self-love and benevolence in order to secure the harmony between 
promoting one’s own and other’s happiness.  
Even if I am correct that conscience oversees and judges self-love and benevolence, one 
might object that conscience is not superior to self-love because self-love also regulates 
conscience. Scholars often cite the following passage to emphasize the supreme role of self-love: 
                                                 
12. In addition, as Wedgewood (2007, pp.203-4) convincingly argues, the harmony of self-love, 
benevolence and conscience is the least compelling claim for Butler’s account. So, if we have to 
stretch Butler’s account for greater plausibility, it is best to reject this claim and highlight the 
potential conflict between different parts of our nature, which speaks in favor of his more 
important doctrine, that is, the supremacy of conscience. 
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 And to all these things may be added, that religion, from whence arises our strongest 
obligation to benevolence, is so far from disowning the principle of self-love…It may be 
allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and revision, that our ideas of 
happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us; that they 
will, nay, if you please, that they ought to prevail over those of order and beauty, and 
harmony, and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossible there ever should be, 
any inconsistence between them…Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does 
indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such: yet, that when 
we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till 
we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it. (S11, 20) 
 
As Irwin (2008, p. 709) and others note, “the appeal to self-love is a concession (“let it be 
allowed”) made for the sake of argument.”13 I agree with this interpretation. Butler does not state 
his view of the proper role of self-love here. He tries to argue that even if one holds self-love as 
the supreme principle, there is no practical harm because self-love and benevolence do not 
conflict. Nonetheless, the previous passage focuses on the normative role of self-love instead of 
its non-normative function. It does not undermine my interpretation because all I aim to show is 
that self-love does not regulate conscience in a non-normative sense.  
One might argue that, however, when deliberating over conflicts of benevolence and self-
love, we seem to experience that self-love reflects upon conscience. In the example of Bobo, 
after her conscience determines that she should help the strangers, she might reconsider this 
determination and reflect whether helping the stranger really contributes to her own happiness. 
Despite this intuition, I do not think self-love actually regulates conscience. On the one hand, 
self-love can only judge about one’s own happiness, and it has already concluded that going to 
the meeting is better than helping the stranger. Conscience takes the judgment of self-love into 
consideration and evaluates self-love against benevolence. The final verdict of conscience 
generates no new information that deserves further reflection from self-love. For example, 
                                                 
13. Also see Sturgeon (1976), Nature and Conscience, p. 338; Broad (1959), Butler, p. 80; 
Wedgewood (2007), Butler on Virtue, p. 197. 
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announcing a verdict against one party, the Supreme Court already know that the verdict is 
against this party’s interest. So, it is redundant that the party reflects again upon the verdict and 
claims “this decision is against my interest.” On the other hand, what we feel as self-love’s 
regulative function might just be self-love’s motivational strength or its uncompromising self-
affirmation. As Butler notes, “Reflection or conscience comes in, and disapproves the pursuit of 
them in these circumstances; but the desire remains [emphasis added]” (S2, 13). What we feel 
might just be the “remaining desire” of self-love, instead of self-love’s judgment upon 
conscience’s verdict. 
3.4 Deriving normativity from regulative function  
Given conscience’s regulative function, why should we act in accordance with it? In 
other words, where does the normative authority of conscience come from? I submit that Butler 
derives the normative authority directly from the regulative function. He starts the discussion of 
the normative hierarchy of human nature with self-love: 
So that, if we will act conformably to the economy of man’s nature, reasonable self-love 
must govern. Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, we may have a clear 
conception of the superior nature of one inward principle to another [my emphasis]; and 
see that there is this natural superiority, quite distinct from degrees of strength and 
prevalence. (S2, 11)  
 
The superiority of self-love to passions indicated in the passage is clearly normative and Butler 
claims that we can establish the superiority without relying on conscience. Butler’s claim 
reinforces my interpretation that the normative superiority does not depend on the function of 
making moral judgments because self-love does not even have this function. The normativity is 
derived from self-love’s regulative function over passions. Butler emphasizes that natural 
superiority obtains in the relation of “one inward principle to another” (S2, 11-12). The relational 
approach fits well with this description. Based on the relational approach, superiority only makes 
24 
sense in a comparative context. Self-love is superior to passions because self-love regulates 
passions. “Self-love is superior” by itself does not express anything substantive. 
Similarly, conscience is superior to self-love and benevolence because it regulates them. 
Butler moves from self-love’s superiority to conscience’s superiority rather quickly because he 
thinks the regulative functions of conscience and self-love are parallel. And once we understand 
the superiority of self-love, we understand the superiority of conscience. This brings us back to 
the crucial passage identified by Wedgewood:  
As from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others: insomuch that you 
cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, 
superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself: and, to 
preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it. (S2, 14). 
 
As Wedgewood correctly points out, for Butler, conscience’s normative authority comes from its 
abilities to judge, direct, and superintend. What Wedgewood finds unclear is Butler’s jump from 
these abilities to conscience’s normative supremacy. The relational approach sheds some light on 
understanding Butler’s argument. What Wedgewood overlooks is the direct relation between 
conscience and other parts. Conscience not only judges, directs, and superintends, but does all 
these upon self-love and benevolence. Conscience is superior to self-love because self-love is the 
subject-matter of conscience and not vice versa. The asymmetrical regulative relation between 
conscience and self-love gives conscience the normative authority. The normative superiority for 
Butler is never unconditional as “A is supreme.” It always has the form “A is superior to B.” 
Thus, the regulative function of conscience does not immediately lead to the unconditional 
obligation---we should act in accordance with conscience. Instead, it leads to the conditional 
obligation---we should act in accordance with conscience rather than self-love. The 
unconditional obligation, or the supremacy of conscience, is established with a further fact that 
conscience is the faculty that judges “without being consulted and without being advised” (S2, 
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8). In other words, human nature as a whole, for Butler, does not have any other parts that are 
superior to conscience. 
The discussion in this section is not an evaluation of the plausibility of Butler’s normative 
theory. It simply presents Butler’s intriguing account, which derives moral obligation from a 
description of human nature as a hierarchical system. This section aims to show that Butler’s 
normative theory is empirical, which is prey to Kant’s methodological rejection. Butler’s 
approach is empirical because it relies on the empirical fact that human nature is hierarchical. In 
addition, since Butler’s claim about human nature is universal, he relies on the generalization of 
particular examples of human behaviors, which is firmly rejects by Kant because it is an 
improper approach to ground moral obligations (G, 4: 408).   
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4 COMPARISONS BETWEEN KANT AND BUTLER 
I have argued that both Kant and Butler aim to ground morality in the description of 
human nature. Their methodological difference on accepting empirical approaches in grounding 
moral obligations rests on their different understanding of human nature. Therefore, to evaluate 
whose approach is better, we need to address two issues: whose account is more successful in 
establishing normativity from description and whose account is a more accurate description of 
human nature. As I shall show in this section, neither of the two questions has an obvious 
answer.   
I will start with the first issue. I think Kant and Butler face the same difficulty. If a 
description of human nature is not intrinsically normative, then as Guyer points out, we feel that 
an argument is needed to show that the natural is also normative (2016, p. 25). Even if Butler’s 
hierarchical system and Kant’s autonomy are inherent in human beings, one might argue that 
they are valueless or even dysfunctional. Thus, following our nature is not morally obligatory. It 
is either morally neutral or even morally objectionable. Guyer points out two ways to bridge this 
gap between description and normativity. The first way is to introduce a “teleological framework 
that will forestall any question about the normative force of the merely natural.” He attributes 
this approach to Adam Smith. He argues that “Smith accepts an essentially Humean account of 
the origin of moral principles in sentiment rather than reason while situating our sentiments 
themselves in a teleological framework” (2016, p. 27). Once the teleological framework is 
introduced, no further explanation is needed to establish the normativity from the description.  
Introducing a teleological framework is a common way to interpret the normative force 
of Butler’s conscience. As Wedgewood argues, Butler holds that every system must have a 
proper function, which is determined by the way the system is “generally disposed to operate in” 
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(2007, p. 183). In other words, “a teleological conception of a system essentially incorporates a 
conception of what is the right or proper state for that system---that is, the state that the system 
ought to be in.” Based on this interpretation, once we find how the system is disposed to operate, 
we find its proper function of the system that ought to be followed. If we accept the teleological 
framework and my interpterion of Butler’s human nature, the normative hierarchy maps onto the 
descriptive hierarchy held by Butler, which states that self-love and benevolence regulate 
passions, conscience regulates self-love and benevolence, and no faculty regulates conscience. 
As a result, we justify the normative hierarchy, which states that we should act in accordance 
with self-love rather than passions; we should act in accordance with conscience rather than self-
love; and conscience is the supreme principle we should follow.  
However, for people who are skeptical about the bridge between description and 
normativity, why should they accept the teleological framework? For the skeptics, the 
teleological framework seems like an ad hoc fix of the problem rather than a genuine argument. 
The concern is that the teleological framework does not add anything valuable in term of the 
justificatory power. Even if it adds something valuable, a new concern is introduced because one 
might ask for the justification of accepting the teleological framework. If we keep providing 
arguments, there is a regress problem that can only be stopped by claiming something as self-
evident. What argument counts as self-evident? I do not have a good answer, but I think my 
interpretation of Butler might suggest the possibility to derive the normality directly from the 
descriptive fact of human nature as a system, without relying on the teleological framework. A 
unique feature of the relational approach is that it entails a sense of order—self-love regulates 
passions and conscience regulates self-love and benevolence. Can this order be the foundation of 
moral obligation? If so, unlike the teleological approach which assumes the existence of a proper 
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end for human beings, Butler’s account can start with a mere hypothesis of such an end. Through 
the exploration of human nature, we find the unique functional hierarchy, which is used for 
grounding moral obligations. Recall Butler’s watch example. If we give a watch to a proficient 
technician who has never seen a watch, can she discover the function of the watch by studying 
its different parts and their relations? If she could, then we might discover our function by 
studying the different parts of human nature and their relations, which opens up a distinctive way 
to ground moral obligations that does not depend upon controversial theological or teleological 
assumptions.      
Another way to bridge the gap between normativity and description suggested by Guyer 
is to introduce what Kames calls the “common nature.” As Guyer points out, In Elements of 
Criticism, Kames claims that  
[T]he “common nature” is just that pattern to which the majority of the species 
happened to conform, and is not an intrinsically normative conception, but is 
nevertheless naturally “conceived” by us “to be a model or standard for each 
individual that belongs to the kind.” (2016, p. 28) 
 
In other words, the universality of a feature in human nature gives rise to the normativity. I doubt 
the universality can help us establish normativity. First of all, any investigation about human 
nature depends on finding something more or less universal. Kant’s conception of autonomy and 
Butler’s hierarchical system of human nature are both supposed to be universal for human 
beings. It is hard to accept a feature as our nature if the feature exists only for a small group of 
human beings. In other words, it is because some features are identified as “common nature,” we 
have some confidence to treat these features as our human nature. The “common nature” can be 
used only for identifying our human nature, rather than providing support to derive normativity 
from human nature. Kames’ suggestion puts the cart before the horse. Second, I think Kant 
correctly warns us that many aspects of our non-rational nature are contingent in a sense that we 
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should not let these aspects define who we are, especially if it is possible to change these aspects. 
If we look back into the history where human beings are more inclined to violence and 
discriminations against gender, race, and sexual orientations, we will not be confident to derive 
normativity solely from universal features of human beings. Learning from history, our current 
“common nature” might still be some outdated survival mechanisms for small tribal society. We 
need to make some kind of evaluative judgment about what the right descriptive facts are.     
If the teleological framework and “common feature” do not provide valuable arguments 
for establishing normativity from descriptions, we might need to resist the skeptical thoughts and 
embrace the idea that we have to establish normativity from the right description of human 
nature. Nonetheless, there is still a significant difference between Kant’s description and Butler’s 
description of human nature. While Butler’s description is essentially empirical, Kant’s 
description is not. Is non-empirical description of human nature more suitable to ground moral 
obligations than an empirical description? This is the question Guyer recommends moral 
philosophers to focus on. He suggests further discussion in moral theory shifts its focus from 
“whether we should rigidly separate normative from descriptive approaches” to “whether within 
the latter we should prefer an empirical method that is heir to the method of Hume, Kames, and 
Smith, or whether we can employ an a priori method that is heir to the rationalist descriptivism 
of Kant’s central period” (2016, p. 35).  Since I am sympathetic to the idea that we can derive 
normativity only from some descriptive facts about who we are, I agree with Guyer’s remark. In 
addition, I think the comparison between Kant and Butler’s methodological difference provides 
an initial step to address the issue. If Kant is correct to point out that non-rational nature is more 
contingent than rational nature, then we might prefer Kant’s description of human nature. Is 
Kant correct in holding this position? This question leads us to the discussion of the second 
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issue, that is, whether Kant provides a more accurate description of human nature than Butler 
does. A thorough comparison between Kant’s and Butler’s accounts of human nature exceeds 
the scope of this paper. I will make some brief remarks of the problems in Kant’s and Butler’s 
accounts, and the potential usefulness of empirical understanding of human beings.  
Human nature is a highly contested concept. There is no consent about what the concept 
refers to. I will adopt some aspects of Maria Kronfeldner’s framework to simplify the issue. 
Kronfeldner distinguishes two conceptions of human. Humankind is a biological group refers to 
Homo sapiens. This biological group is fixed by the genealogy, which includes intergenerational 
transmission of development resources and biological ancestor-descendent linages. Humanity, in 
contrast, is a social group whose membership is determined “by a set of traits that this group at a 
certain time regards self-referentially and discursively as necessary and sufficient for being a 
person and thus a member of humanity” (Kronfeldner 2018, pp.4-5). For Kant and Butler, the 
proper conception of human is humanity instead of humankind because not everyone in 
humankind is subjected to morality. The human nature that is important to them is the nature of 
humanity.  
Another question is: what does it mean for a feature to be the nature of humanity? In 
other words, what are the traits or features that qualifies us to be the members of humanity, thus 
be the appropriate subjects of morality. As Leslie Stevenson points out, we should be alert to 
possible confusions when someone says “Human beings are naturally X.” One might mean “All 
(or most) humans are X.” or “Human beings ought to be X.” or “Human beings have an innate 
tendency to X.” or “Human beings were X before civilization.”14 My interpretation of Butler and 
Kant claims that they infer morality from human nature. Therefore, human nature cannot be the 
                                                 
14.  Leslie Stevenson, Thirteen Theories of Human Nature (Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 11. 
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normative conceptions of what human beings ought to be. The reason for not using a normative 
conception of human nature is to avoid a potential circularity. The central purpose for Kant and 
Butler is to justify moral obligations, which requires them to justify their claims such as we 
ought to act according to the law derived from the categorical imperative commands or we ought 
to act according to conscience. It is true that part of their projects is to explain why we ought to 
X instead of Y, but the crux is to explain where the normative force in the “ought to” comes 
from. If we infer the normative force of morality from the normative conceptions of human 
nature such as we ought to be autonomous beings or we ought to perfect the faculty of 
conscience, it seems to me that we only provide an explanation of the normativity in morality but 
not a justification. If we look for justification, using a normative conception of human nature 
traps us into a circle because we never justify “ought to” with something independent of “ought 
to.” In order to avoid the circularity, the normativity of moral obligations must be justified with a 
descriptive conception of human nature, which refers to the universality or the typicality of 
humanity. 
However, taking an empirical approach, we cannot identify the universal or typical 
features of humanity before identifying the category of humanity because we must know the 
subjects of the studies before studying them. This is the central difficulty for Butler. Thus, it 
seems that we can only understand the nature of humanity with the universal or the typical 
features of humankind, that is, H. sapiens. The problem for this approach is its temporal 
constraint because we can only study H.sapiens up to this time. Let’s assume we have a full 
understanding of humankind up to this time, and we are able to identify the common nature 
shared by human beings as a species. Are we willing to call the shared features as non-
contingent thus using them to define humanity? I do not think so because we have already 
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witnessed the change of the features shared by a large group of humankind for a relatively long 
period. Many of the universal features we have been possessing could be overwritten by other 
features we have not yet developed. These potential features can be equally desirable for 
humanity. Therefore, limiting the conception of human nature within the features of past 
humankind seems to be overly narrow. 
Nonetheless, there is a potential way to strengthen Butler’s and other empirical approach 
against the temporal constraints. As C. D Broad suggests, instead of discussing the actual nature, 
we can identify the ideal nature based on the actual nature. For example, we can form the 
conceptions of a perfect watch, perfectly straight lines, or perfect circles without such objects in 
Nature (1959, pp. 57-9). Although a somewhat mystical ability to abstract ideal nature is 
required, this ability is not counterintuitive. We always picture a better version of ourselves 
based on the past and current self. It seems that the more we know about ourselves, the easier it 
is to grasp the ideal version of ourselves. I think we can do the same thing for humanity. We 
reflect upon ourselves as data for ideal human nature. If this is true, then empirical understanding 
of human nature is essential because the process of idealization requires us to know actual 
human beings.  
Kant’s metaphysical approach seems to have some advantages because it does not have 
the temporal constraint. For Kant, rational beings are necessarily autonomous. However, can we 
confidently define human nature without any empirical understanding of us? Is autonomy the 
only essential part of us? Are we really willing to hold features such as conscience, love, care, or 
sympathy as merely contingent? I think we can actually hold Kant’s emphasis on autonomy 
while accepting some empirical features as not contingent for humanity. The reason is that 
Kant’s conception of autonomy does not rule out the possibility to freely choose conscience, 
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love, care and sympathy as the essential nature of humanity. Kant seems to think that choosing 
these features is not a “free choice” of pure reason because inclinations towards these features 
drive us to make the choice. Yet, if the defining feature of an autonomous being is the capacity 
to set her ends without being influenced by any particular experience, it must be possible to 
choose conscience, love, or sympathy without any inclination towards conscience, love or 
sympathy. If this is the case, we cannot rely solely on a pure a priori approach because we need 
empirically informed descriptions about us to help us make better choices. If it is correct that 
empirical knowledge of human nature plays a role in idealizing or choosing what constitutes 
humanity, then Butler’s account of morality, which is derived from his description of human 
nature as a system, is a counterexample to Kant’s position that moral obligations can only be 
grounded in a priori justifications. 
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